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The Chastity Society: Disciplining Muslim Men 
 
At a time when Western humanitarian rescue discourses seek to save Muslim 
women from irrational and violent Islamic masculinities, the Jordanian Islamist 
charity “the Chastity Society” seeks to train young men to restrain their 
excessive masculine passions to ensure that Muslim women are spared the fate 
of the benighted and oppressed Western woman. This article traces parallel 
emphases on gender essentialism, rationality, cultural pathology, and abjection 
to argue that a shared language of contention unites both Islamists and those 
who advocate for Western humanitarian interventions. I explore how several 
kinds of social control are legitimized through these symmetrical polemics 
about gender, order, and civilization. 
 
In recent years, a number of scholars have investigated how the 
‘Muslim woman’ has emerged in Western media imaginaries as a figure of 
abject victimhood while the normative ‘Muslim man’ has become a figure of 
threat and danger. Many analysts have challenged this caricature, showing how 
gendered ‘civilizational discourses’ (Massad 2007) have been constructed 
historically and whom they serve. Geopolitics coincides with a diverse range 
of factors to produce an intense fixation on (putatively) Islamic gender roles, 
forming a symbiotic relationship with anti-immigration advocacy, the 
publishing industry’s demand for lurid content, and the contemporary political 
economy of NGO fundraising.  
Yet amidst failed military campaigns, well-publicized massacres and 
terror attacks, and lurid revelations like those that emerged from the Abu 
Ghraib prison, there is growing discomfort with what Lara Deeb and Jessica 
Winegar describe as, “the use of women’s liberation as justification for US 
military misadventures in Muslim-majority societies” (2012: 544). Jasbir Puar 
(2007) writes extensively about the sexual pathologization of Muslims in 
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Western popular culture and NGO activism. Miriam Cooke (2007) argues that 
Western discourses about the Muslim community erase its diversity and 
complexity, replacing it with a single metonymic figure, simultaneously 
vulnerable and unsettlingly inscrutable, that she sardonically labels “the 
muslimwoman.” In her analysis of the Arab Human Development Report, 
Frances Hasso contends that the report is concerned with “empowering 
governmentalities rather than women” (2005). Lila Abu Lughod (2002, 2014) 
asks, “do Muslim women need saving?” She is especially wary of those who 
would use arguments about the status of women as a rationale for military 
intervention. Paul Amar (2011a; 2011b) goes even further, contextualizing 
these discourses as a subset of a broader, transnational “humanitarian rescue 
discourse.” Perhaps the deepest ethnographic engagement with this dynamic 
has been Katherine Ewing’s Stolen Honor: Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin, 
which argues that German Muslims are systematically dehumanized by 
Western humanitarian discourses that position them in a “zone of 
uninhabitability” (Butler 1993), “in a transnational imaginary in which the 
‘modern’ is constituted in opposition to the ‘traditional’ as abjected other” 
(Ewing 2012: 3). In all of these cases, imaginative geographies of gender 
privilege and subjugation serve the emotional needs of mass-mediated 
publics—and they do so in ways easily portrayed as orientalist (Said 1978: 48-
72). 
Perhaps as a necessary corollary of this intellectual trend, relatively 
little attention is given to how Muslim reformers use a similar (and similarly 
gendered) civilizational discourse to justify their own role in saving Muslim 
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women. Drawing on fieldwork conducted among Jordanian Islamists1 from 
2010-2012, I will try to correct this analytical imbalance. I will show how the 
contemporary Islamist movement works to tame specific forms of excessive 
masculinity that are associated, by Muslim activists themselves, with the 
cultural pathology of tradition and its concomitant irrationality. I argue that 
Islamists and their Western detractors share a common “language of 
contention” (Roseberry 1994), with a similar set of beliefs about the 
relationship between gender, human nature, violence, and reason. As Western 
critics seek to discipline Muslim men, they are likely to find that Islamist 
groups are busily engaged in the same efforts, co-opting novel discourses of 
‘humanitarian rescue’ in order to save women from men in their own 
specifically Islamist terms. 
This article is based on my research with an Islamist organization in 
Jordan called “The Chastity Society” (jama‘iyyat al-‘afāf al-khayriyya), one of 
many such “Chastity Societies” associated with the Muslim Brotherhood that 
form a network of organizations stretching from Algeria to Tunisia, from Syria 
to Yemen, disseminating educational materials about Islam and the family, 
offering training courses, and organizing mass weddings2. My conclusions are 
based on interviews with members and beneficiaries of the Chastity Society, its 
publications, and participant observation conducted at its mass weddings, 
training courses, and fundraisers. My analysis is enhanced at points through 
                                                 
1 While the term Islamist is sometimes used pejoratively, I use it here simply to specify those 
Muslims who see their faith as part of a broader political, often explicitly anti-imperialist 
project. 
2 The Chastity Society’s 2015 mass wedding can be seen here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CeTCToiNAKg  
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insights gleaned from almost four years spent living, working, and doing 
research among precisely the kinds of Jordanian working-class men who are 
the primary target of the society’s gender and family programming. After 
setting the scene, I will provide a brief overview of the Chastity Society’s 
ideology as depicted in its own pamphlets before turning to the sexual 
education module it uses in its marriage training courses. These materials 
highlight the extent to which the organization is aware of and actively engaged 
with contemporary global discourses around gender and sexuality. In the 
second half of the article, I turn to the Chastity Society’s pedagogical 
treatments of Sharia, which, for many of its members, are the necessary and 
sufficient impetus for their activism. In the conclusion, I suggest that the 
symmetry between Islamist and Western interventionist approaches to gender 
and the centrality of abjection to their shared language of contention should 
make us skeptical of persistent attempts to differentiate these discourses. 
Perhaps more can be gained by exploring the hidden and often sublimated 
assumptions that constitute their shared ground. 
Setting the Scene: Saturday Morning in the Auditorium 
 In the summer of 2012, I attended a training course for soon-to-be-
married couples hosted by the Chastity Society. It took place in the offices of 
the Jordanian Engineers Association in downtown Amman3, in an imposing 
high-modernist building that had aged well. The facilities were ample for such 
                                                 
3 As one of the many Jordanian unions and professional associations whose memberships 
regularly elect a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated leadership, the Jordanian Engineers 
Association is ideologically predisposed to offer their facilities in support of the Society’s 
charitable efforts. 
 5 
an event, complete with auditoria, classrooms, and catering. Two of the 
intellectuals who had organized the course were Dr. ‘Adl Latfi and Dr. Mufid 
Sarhan, both sporting closely cropped beards and clad in suits. They thanked 
me for coming and told me what to expect. Emphasizing the prefigurative role 
of the training course I was about to witness, Dr. ‘Adl told me, “There’s 
training for every institution: the bank, teachers, of course the army. The army 
has lots of training. So there has to be training for marriage as well since 
marriage is the most important institution. It should be as important as the 
medical test [required for marriage in Jordan]. One day, people will go to the 
courthouse and they will bring a medical test and a certificate from a course 
like this.” While training courses had long been part of the charity’s annual 
mass weddings, I was told that what I was seeing was a compressed version of 
a two-day course that had been given to various groups of couples across the 
Muslim world for years. They led me to the auditorium. 
Most of the forty-five attendees appeared to be in their early twenties. 
The women mostly wore colorful headscarves, although a few wore black and 
veiled their faces. Some wore floor-length skirts while others opted for the 
jilbāb (a coat which runs from the neck to the floor and down to the wrists). 
The young men wore the latest in working-class youth fashion: tight jeans, 
dress shoes, and the kind of button-up shirts made to be worn un-tucked. I took 
my seat and waited. The men’s side of the room was largely silent, while a 
number of women on the other side of the room chatted quietly, producing a 
good deal of subtle laughter. 
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As I learned from talking to the male beneficiaries as they smoked 
during the breaks between sessions4, there was a fairly common narrative of 
having been introduced to the Chastity Society by members of the charity who 
were active in their neighborhoods or kin networks5. Everyone I talked to told 
me that they were drawn to participate in the organization’s activities due to 
the financial constraints that often left young men and women unable to marry. 
Most said that it was the only way they could afford to marry. One man (a 
college student and clear outlier) said it was “cheaper and easier.” Another 
confided to me that his was a case of “forbidden love” and that his parents 
were refusing all assistance. He claimed that most of the men were in the same 
position, although they might not be as forthcoming. 
Whatever their individual circumstances, they all implied that they had 
come to the course under some degree of duress. Attendance was a 
precondition for participation in the next week’s free mass wedding. Thus, 
early on in the training, there was some hostility towards the Society’s agenda, 
especially its attacks on certain male prerogatives. After the introductory 
portion of the course on the Sharia was over and the men were clamoring at the 
door to go out for a cigarette, one man exclaimed, “Damn this course—it’s not 
                                                 
4 Despite my attempts to enlist a female Arabic-speaking social scientist to help me interview 
female beneficiaries in a respectful and sensitive manner, I was never able to arrange it.  
5 When I noted to Dr. Mufid that many of the beneficiaries came from a particular Palestinian 
refugee camp, he emphasized that the beneficiaries were drawn from every governorate in the 
kingdom and included Syrian refugees. Some people I knew who were hostile to the Islamic 
movement told me the charity’s beneficiaries would be, in a word, “shameless”. As far as I 
could tell, however, beneficiaries were not overly Islamist in orientation—nor did they all fit 
prevailing stereotypes of the movement as overwhelmingly urban, Palestinian, and poor. 
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teaching anyone but my ass,” which provoked roars of laughter. However, by 
the end of the day when the participants were divided by gender for the sexual 
education module, the combination of Islamic discourses, biomedical 
discourses, and practical representations of gender in working-class Jordanian 
communities had largely won the audience over.  
A Shared Language of Contention Around Gender 
Founded in 1993 to promote marriage and discourage extramarital sex, 
the Chastity Society is well known across Jordan primarily for its mass 
weddings, but also for its research and publishing about the family and the 
millions of dollars in interest-free loans it has distributed to newlyweds in 
cooperation with the Jordan Islamic Bank. Led by ‘Abdul-Latif Arabiyyat, 
former head of the Islamic Action Front (the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s 
political party), the Society is one of the best-funded and most important 
institutions within the broader Jordanian Islamist movement. While there is a 
growing number of women’s groups in the Muslim world that seek to 
harmonize Western notions of gender rights and Islam (cf. Abu Lughod 2014), 
the Chastity Society is not one of them. It is certainly a trenchant critic of 
Jordanian society at large, which it sees as ignorant, backward, mired in blind 
tradition, and crying out for social uplift initiatives. But its leading intellectuals 
also dismiss Western approaches to gender as a confused reaction to the abject 
condition of women in the West itself.  
The cover of one of the Society’s internationally distributed pamphlets, 
Al-Jindir (Gender), shows a snake (emblazoned with the word “GENDER” 
written in English) destroying a family’s home. The authors, Mithna Amīn Al-
Kurdistani and Kāmīlīa Hilmī Muhammed, argue that fixating on the term 
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“gender” is a culturally specific Western phenomenon. They recount a familiar 
intellectual history in which a concept (gender) once reserved for denoting the 
grammatical categories of masculine and feminine came to stand for the social 
construction, and possible artifice, of masculinity and femininity in general. 
Such polemics are evidence of what William Roseberry calls a shared 
“language of contention”, not merely because they adopt a similar vocabulary, 
but because they represent “a common material and meaningful framework for 
living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by 
domination” (1994: 361). For example, throughout the pamphlet, the authors 
reject the term “gender” as a “Western” concept while reproducing in their 
polemic the tendency to reify an ontological divide between nature and culture. 
They also assume that humans can be corrupted or uplifted through cultural 
particularity and the more or less judicious use of language. These ideas 
function as sources of legitimacy for conflicting political forces that hope to 
convince others of their ability to enjoin the correct forms of culturally-
prescribed behaviors. Thus surface-level ideological disagreements help to 
disguise the extent to which groups like the Chastity Society nonetheless freely 
engage with and borrow from opposing discourses, technologies, and 
organizational forms—even as they simultaneously maintain their own 
peculiar ideological coherence. 
Al-Kurdistani and Muhammed argue that certain Westerners have 
completely exaggerated the significance of rather trivial realizations about the 
artifice of grammatical gender and now ignore the importance of biological sex 
entirely. They argue that a notion of complete equality between the biological 
sexes leaves women vulnerable and is therefore not equality at all since it fails 
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to respect women’s biological particularities. Whenever the general thrust of 
the women’s liberation movement is in line with the authors’ essentialist 
interpretation of gender roles in Islam, the authors treat the correspondence as 
validation of Islamic precepts. Whenever there is divergence, the authors 
depict it as the deleterious product of a “radical” or “extremist” Western 
civilization. As the Chastity Society’s President Dr. Abdul-Latif Arabiyyat 
cautions in the forward, “with America at its head, the West seeks the spread 
of its decadent social values, its model of globalization, and on every level the 
imposition of its system of values as universal human values, despite causing 
destruction, dissolution, and perversion for these communities” (Al-Kurdistani 
and Muhammed 2004: 6). Yet for all the organization’s concerns about the 
abject state of gender relations in the West, the day-to-day activities of the 
Chastity Society are largely dedicated to reducing the threats that Muslim men 
might pose to the social order of their own communities—the “disciplining” 
project with which this article will primarily concern itself. 
 My use of the term “discipline” to describe the Chastity Society’s 
attempts to control the passions of Muslim men cannot help but evoke 
Foucault. This is deliberate. Quoting Foucault as saying things like “pleasure is 
its own end” and “whoever has the authority has the language,” Al-Kurdistani 
and Muhammed assert that Foucault and his followers are engaged in what 
they term (in English) “the reconstruction of language” (i‘ādat aṣ-ṣiyaghat al-
lugha), resurrecting the Epicurean “hedonism” of ancient Greece “until the 
biological nature of the woman repudiates it” (2004: 19-26). While these 
quotations of Foucault may be inaccurate or oddly interpreted, his prominent 
place in the pamphlet provides its conservative, Arabic-speaking, Muslim 
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readers a taste of the intellectual ferment surrounding post-Foucauldian 
approaches to gender and sexuality. The Foucauldian “reconstruction of 
language” is put forward as the blueprint for Western feminist activism in 
general. The authors use it to make sense of the “emergence of the term 
gender” (9) its place in “UN documents” (45), the “effects of the feminist 
movement on the Arab world and the transmission of the term gender for 
application in the Arab world” (53), “the globalization of the idea of the new 
femininity” (77), “summary readings on some international documents on 
women” (91) and then conclude their argument with a section entitled, “the 
fruits of the woman” (115), in which they chronicle the oppressed state of 
women in the contemporary West. Despite their portrait of the ‘reconstruction 
of language’ as a terrifying release of nihilistic passions that have brought 
about the widespread victimization of women, Al-Kurdistani and Muhammed 
show a striking appreciation for its efficacy as a framework for thinking about 
and acting upon the social order. 
 It would be easy to dismiss this sort of rhetoric as appropriative, 
opportunistic, insincere, or perhaps as merely a well-intentioned response to a 
Western incitement to discourse around gender and sexuality. However, closer 
attention to the charitable efforts and hermeneutic sensibilities of the Chastity 
Society makes clear that their work is in fact quite sincere and that it is 
strongly rooted in an Islamic discursive tradition that pre-dates Western 
feminism. Here, I draw methodological inspiration from Amar’s ethnography, 
The Security Archipelago (2011b), which employs a networked, multi-polar 
framework to understand the circulation of “humanitarian rescue” discourses 
amidst the development of new security regimes in Brazil and Egypt. This 
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study is a welcome corrective to Eurocentric imperial historiographies in 
which ideas are always assumed to emerge from the imperial center on a hub-
and-spoke model. Amar’s focus on long-term intercultural exchanges outside 
of the imperial metropole avoids simplistic pronouncements about the 
diffusion or independent invention of humanitarian rescue discourses by 
showing how globally situated actors have long been deeply enmeshed in each 
other’s ideological projects. However, I trace out a very different genealogy 
than Amar here by exploring the strong connections between the Chastity 
Society’s contemporary efforts to reform gender relations and the broader 
Islamic “discursive tradition” (cf. Asad 1986). Where Amar offers a timely 
intervention by focusing on emerging contradictions within neoliberal societies 
of the global South, I emphasize the longue durée. Islamic conceptions of 
human nature, tradition, and reason are sophisticated and complex. Those who 
are committed to them have little need for the innovations of outside moral 
crusaders—although such innovations can be readily adapted to an Islamic 
discursive tradition. 
“You’re all so Educated”: Medicalizing Islamic Ethics 
The best indication of the primacy of Quranic authority over 
biomedical authority in the Society’s educational efforts was the order of the 
presentations themselves—the first of which was given by the Sharia Court 
Judge, Dr. Samir Al-Qabah. His talk, entitled “The rights of the woman and the 
rights of the man,” was followed by two workshops on marital adab (manners, 
propriety, politesse). The first workshop was led by a tall, slim man in his 
thirties with an immaculate beige suit with burgundy accents on the cuffs. The 
second was led by a woman, also in her thirties, who was a dentist and had 
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studied psychology. For the final portion of the course, participants were 
divided up by gender for frank discussions led by medical professionals about 
what they could expect on their wedding nights. After his presentation, Dr. 
Nidal6, who led the sexual education session for the men, underlined the 
consciousness of the choice of structure for the training when he explained my 
research project to the young men. “What’s interesting about Geoffrey’s 
project,” he said,  “is that he’s doing it in the Western way. The Westerners 
start with the material and the economic and move to the social and the ethical 
and then the spiritual. We begin with religion and move to ethics.” Key to this 
notion that the Society was starting from religion and moving towards ethics 
was the sincere belief on the part of participants that they were being faithful to 
their textual tradition in their efforts to cultivate proper gender roles. This 
belief is contested by multiple parties, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, and 
taking a position is expected of anyone who engages with the tradition or the 
disputes that define it. As an ethnographer, I will be referring to the secondary 
literature on gender and Islamic law prior to colonialism not to valorize or 
debunk The Chastity Society’s assertions, but rather to do justice to the 
hermeneutical depth of my interlocutors’ claims about gender. 
At the end of the day, we were divided by gender for the sex education 
portion of the course. The men were sent to a room with a large conference 
table. Dr. Nidal entered with a poster of the male and female reproductive 
systems and a plastic model of the female reproductive system. He was a 
jovial, rotund man with a white beard and a light grey suit. He set up his visual 
aids and began by saying, “There are the days of marriage and the days after. 
                                                 
6 This is a pseudonym.  
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You’re all so educated, young men,” he said with a knowing intonation. 
“Mashallah7!” You have the internet. You have the satellite. You have 
Facebook.” He smiled deviously and the men began to laugh. “All of you are 
educated.” He turned a bit more serious and said, “But you should take 
information from respectful places.” He explained to them that, of all the 
religions, “Our religion is the only religion that gives the woman her rights.” 
He continued, “And marriage is worship (‘abada) in our religion. Marriage is 
very important for Muslims. It’s not like Europe. Now they have marriage 
between a man and a man—a man and an animal!” He continued, “A lot of 
youths think marriage is just for looking at her like a game. No. Marriage is 
worship.” With his oblique references to dating tools like Facebook and the 
ubiquity of Western pornography on the internet and satellite television, Dr. 
Nidal framed the final portion of the course as a scientifically informed Islamic 
corrective to the perverse gender roles promulgated by the Western media. He 
said, “Our women, God be pleased, are shy. They’re not like European women 
you see [on television and in pornography]. Some of them are afraid. Slowly, 
slowly.”  
Islamist concerns about the malign effects of Western pornography 
have become sufficiently common that they have begun to attract the attention 
of the Western media, most notably through the work of Wedad Lootah. 
Lootah, an Emirati marriage counselor who wrote a book entitled Top Secret: 
Marital Intimacy… Roots and Etiquette, has received bemused coverage in 
venues like The New York Times. The Times quoted the Mufti of Dubai (who 
cleared the book for publication) as warning that, despite its doctrinal 
                                                 
7 Meaning, ‘What God wills’ or ‘God be pleased’ 
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soundness, “Arab readers might not be ready for such a book” (Worth 2009). 
Yet as Lootah herself makes clear, the implication that Arab publics (unlike 
Western ones) might be too chaste, naïve, or easily shocked for such a book is 
quite disingenuous. In fact, Arab publics are constantly exposed to the whole 
range of Western sexual practices, from Hollywood films to commercially 
produced erotica to the iconic images of sexual torture from Abu Ghraib. This 
is why Lootah characterizes her society’s stance on sexual propriety as stuck 
“between ignorance and false modesty,” with ignorance (jāhiliyya) here 
implying as much a boorish lack of restraint as a lack of knowledge. Lootah 
defends her choice of topic vociferously, insisting that “God wanted me to 
choose this subject to try to uncover some hidden aspects of [marital 
happiness] for my chaste sisters.” In fact, she attacks the very implication that 
her contribution to the discourse of sexual and marital health could be a 
scandal. Such an insinuation is as itself evidence of the hypocrisy around sex 
that she is denouncing: “practices that God has forbidden are spreading in our 
houses and on every level in this domain, from pornographic films to forbidden 
practices” (Lootah 2009: 11). Like the Chastity Society, Lootah is concerned 
that delayed marriage leads to sexual and marital dysfunction. She is 
particularly concerned that men will be conditioned to prefer pornography, sex 
with men, or anal sex to lawful sex with their wives. 
For his part, Dr. Nidal began his presentation by turning to his poster 
and listing off the various parts of the male anatomy using proper medical 
terms: prostate (muwatha), testicles (khiṣītīn), and so on. He explained how the 
testicles contained ḥīywān minawī (sperm), which were released from the 
penis. The penis, he explained, is “like a sponge” that collects blood—growing 
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“from five or six centimeters to fifteen or sixteen centimeters.” He attempted to 
explain the female anatomy for the men as well—skipping rapidly upwards 
toward the birth canal (qanāt al-wilāda) and womb (raḥam). Dr. Nidal’s 
presentation echoed the concerns of activists like Lootah. It also represented a 
more general continuation of the Society’s attempt to inculcate restraint as a 
masculine virtue while reifying distinctly essentialized masculine and feminine 
gender roles. Throughout the day, these roles were justified with reference to a 
relatively simplified and conservative biomedical model of human sexual 
dimorphism that began with normative sex organs, moved on to note gendered 
differences in average size and strength, and concluded with hormōnāt 
(hormones), which might influence anything from one’s affect to one’s 
suitability for certain occupations.  
However, this biomedical vocabulary for talking about essentialized 
gender roles was sutured to critiques of male behavior with deep histories not 
only in Jordan, but throughout the Muslim world. As Michael Peletz (1994) 
has argued in his work on Malaysian Sharia practitioners, Islamic masculinities 
often portray men as quintessentially rational (as possessors of ‘aql) in an 
“official” sense, while simultaneously acknowledging their nearly universal 
shortcomings in that regard at another, more practical level as rational actors in 
everyday life. According to Peletz, rationality here is not simply “about” 
gender. Rationality helps define all sorts of socially salient contrasts. It is what 
separates humans from animals. Children, non-Muslims, and the weak-minded 
all lack restraint and thus remain vulnerable to manipulation by the forces of 
evil: bad people, jinn, and the devil himself. Religious practice, in a vital sense, 
is about developing one’s reason to avoid such snares, regardless of gender. 
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Still, “practical representations of gender portray men as less reasonable (i.e., 
having less ‘reason’), and less responsible than women both with regard to 
managing money and other household resources, and in terms of honoring 
basic social obligations associated with marriage, parenting and kinship 
generally” (Peletz 1994: 152). Likewise, the Chastity society highlighted the 
dangers of masculine selfishness, aggression, and entitlement8.  
The refrain, “slowly, slowly,” was also reminiscent of nuptial advice I 
had heard many times before. It was evidence that the Chastity Society was 
drawing on a deep reservoir of “practical representations” of masculinity. The 
appeal to slowness, delicacy, and care was emphasized so extensively that at a 
certain point I stopped writing it down in my notes. Dr. Nidal warned his 
students, “There was a man down in the [Jordan] valley who tried and tried to 
enter the girl, and finally he tried violently and the girl died. Think about the 
girl the night of consummation. You haven’t slept the night of the wedding or 
the night before—and a man can bear more. Some people forget nice words, 
‘Enough! Cut his head (get it over with)!’” The room erupted with laughter, 
the men displaying a visible sense of relief from the tension of the subject 
matter. A young man raised his hand and said, “Pray two rakāt (bows) and 
then enter slowly, slowly—calmly.” The doctor nodded. Returning to his 
cautionary tale, he said, “It was all because he hurried. And it was worst in the 
old days. People would be looking from the windows; they came early in the 
                                                 
8 Recent scholarship on Arab masculinity demonstrates that these ‘practical representations’ 
continue to circulate and inform local anxieties about manhood (cf. Ghannam 2013, Inhorn 
2012) 
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morning [to visit the couple after the defloration]. It was bad. But now they go 
to a hotel by themselves. This is a better way.” 
The relentless attack on tradition and local custom continued 
throughout the day. Yet the Society’s polemic, however contemporary it 
sounded, rested on much older Islamic critiques. The idea of “nature” that lay 
beneath the Society’s biomedical accounts of the gendered and sexed human 
body were ultimately grounded in the Islamic concept of fiṭra, the divinely 
endowed potential of all living organisms. The problem for the activists, 
though, was that humans, uniquely capable of being led astray, are always at 
the mercy of ‘adāt wa taqālīd: customs and traditions—or habits and blind 
repetition. As we were taught, this constitutes a sort of second nature. It is not 
supposed to be opposed to one’s first nature, instinct, or fiṭra, but it is only 
through Islamic instruction that one’s second nature can be used to perfect 
one’s first nature—with the aid of God’s grace.  
Saba Mahmood, writing about this strain of thought within the Islamic 
Movement, identified it with Aristotelian virtue ethics. She argues that, unlike 
the Kantian ethics that have tended to displace virtue ethics in the Western 
academy, morality for contemporary Muslims is “both realized through and 
manifest in outward behavioral forms” (Mahmood 2005: 25) without Kant’s 
“telescoping of moral action down to the movements of the will” (Mahmood 
2005: 26). Mahmood’s point is not necessarily that anyone involved in a 
Chastity Society training course would invoke the works of Aristotle. Dr. 
Nidal would certainly be familiar with them; the young man who suggests that 
one disciplineing one’s body on the wedding night through prayer likely would 
not. Yet the desire for an embodied (and engendered) ethics and the cultivation 
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of highly disciplined outward behavioral forms has long been a crucial part of 
the intellectual milieu of Islam, its religious precursors, and its ideological 
competitors as well. Hussein Agrama calls this widespread concern, following 
Foucault, “the care of the self” (2010: 13). In fact, we know this precisely 
because so much energy has been expended by Islamic scholars in both 
reading Aristotle and trying to stem his influence9. Within this broad, under-
defined “tradition,” which we might identify with a sort of Eurasian 
scholasticism, certain good habits have historically been associated with virtue, 
ethics, and the spiritual elite while bad traditions are “often linked with 
laypeople, ‘practices that gain their authority from simple iteration’” (cf. 
Sparrow and Hutchinson 2013: 92). Tradition in this reading is the constant 
tormenter of society’s most abject members. This assumption is reflected in the 
Islamic Movement’s concern with purifying and authenticating the Islamic 
tradition, an agenda amply documented in the work of Mahmood and other 
ethnographers (e.g., Deeb 2006; Hirschkind 2006). The result in places like 
Jordan has been a continual struggle to save Islam, as a purified discursive 
tradition, from ‘adāt wa taqālid (lowbrow customs and blind repetition). 
As Dr. Nidal excoriated the backwardness of local traditions around the 
wedding night and consummation, he turned to another long-running point of 
contention between Islamic law and local custom: the relevance of female 
bukāra (virginity) to marriage. “There are,” he said, “some women who don’t 
                                                 
9 Despite being eminently useful, medicine (especially Galenic medicine) has long been 
identified by the Islamic scholarly elite as a major vector of heterodox philosophical ideas, 
including Aristotelianism and Platonism (Al-Ghazali 2002; D’Ancona 2005; Wisnovsky 
2005). 
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have a hymen. Maybe 10% of women don’t have one. Remember: it is a very 
small hole, but it can grow to 12 or 14 centimeters in childbirth because of the 
head of the baby. But there isn’t always blood [after first sexual intercourse]. 
My first daughter didn’t have blood. This is very serious. This could affect the 
other daughters too.” The men were hushed and concerned and nodded. The 
doctor continued, “and my daughter is an absolutely lawful girl. Luckily, we 
went to the doctor and brought a report and the other family accepted it.” 
Campaigning against virginity tests is a long-running concern of Islamic 
leaders in the region. Judith Tucker notes in her study of three seventeenth 
century Ottoman muftis in Syria and Palestine that they were “unanimous… in 
their condemnation of the practice,” basing their reasoning on the same 
medical arguments as Dr. Nidal about how the hymen can be “damaged or 
destroyed in a number of ways, including by accident or illness” (Tucker 1998: 
67-68).  
At this point, Dr. Nidal began running out of things to say, returning to 
his mantra: slowly, slowly. “Try one or two times only. “If no blood comes 
out, don’t try five times! If there’s a lot of blood coming out, go to a doctor. 
It’s getting better now… but people used to die. Are there any questions?” The 
director, Dr. Mufid, also asked, “Are there any questions?” The room was 
quiet. Dr. Mufid said, “And if any of you have questions later…” One of the 
men blurted out, “Give me your phone number!” Immediately, every man 
pulled out his phone and saved Dr. Nidal’s number. They begged for a 
cigarette break, but Dr. Mufid asked them to wait for the women to finish so 
they could distribute the certificates. A man joked, “So we can hang it on the 
wall?” Another said, “Theoretical and, next week, practical!” The women’s 
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discussion dragged on and on. Dr. Nidal tried to return to important points: 
“Take [information] from cultured and religious sources.” He also emphasized, 
“Give her her right. She is your partner in all things—even sexual matters. One 
way or the other it’s important she’s happy. She can go to the judge [and ask 
for divorce on these grounds]… And if she doesn’t have religion she will 
[commit adultery] because of the tension.” Here, the ideal of the wholly 
rational male head of household confronted an alternative figure: the self-
centered fool who brings his own cuckolding upon himself. 
Dr. Nidal spoke about how he had gotten involved with the 
organization in the 1990s when he saw young men putting off marriage and the 
government’s unwillingness to address the problem. “A lot of people damage 
their daughters,” he said. “Now with the phones and Internet and Facebook, the 
men and women can meet. Thank God! In every house there’s a spinster.” He 
talked about his own family history: studying medicine in Germany in the 
1970s and living cheaply. He met a “lawful girl” and her father “thank god” 
said, “It is enough that you are a good Muslim.” He described their wedding: 
“We made [chicken and rice] for maybe ten or fifteen people and got an 
apartment.” Imagining a greater governmental role in solving the country’s 
marriage crisis, he suggested the creation of a national marriage fund, which he 
said had been successful in Malaysia: “When a young man turns 18, he gets a 
thousand or two to marry.”  
The doctor’s presentation, despite carrying with it an elaborate and 
sustained critique of traditional Arab patriarchal gender roles, was far less 
dependent on his medical expertise and Western education than one might 
initially think. To the contrary, this belief in the perfectibility of human nature 
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through Islamic discipline and the dangers of practices that gain authority 
through sheer repetition is quite old and widespread. The same holds for the 
“practical representations” of men as selfish, profligate, potentially violent, and 
neglectful of their kin duties. Such representations even have a somewhat 
“official” basis: the frequently-invoked specter of ignorance embedded in the 
term jāhiliyya. Now commonly glossed as “ignorance,” William Shepherd 
reminds us that it also means, “a tendency to go to extremes of behavior, 
whether in violence, revenge, boasting, drinking, or even generosity, and was 
sometimes even considered a virtue” (2013: 269-270). Within the Chastity 
Society’s etiology of ignorance, however, the causes of jāhiliyya are not the 
frailties of human nature, but rather the community’s excessive and unnatural 
attempts to restrain youth sexuality. Perversely, these forms of vulgar custom 
grow out of excessive passions and also foster them, ‘damaging’ daughters 
while driving men to pornography, homosexuality, and marital dysfunction, 
potentially leaving all in a state of moral abjection. In response, the Chastity 
Society envisions itself, possibly aided in the future by the state, as working to 
restrain the excessive masculine passions of the youth to save their humanity. 
“The Rights and Duties of the Spouses”: Islamic Antecedents 
Dr. Samir’s talk, entitled “the rights and duties of the spouses,” would 
attempt to correct these forms of excessive masculinity by drawing on a rich 
discourse within Islamic jurisprudence related to proper gender roles and how 
blind tradition can undermine them. Dr. Samir, a conscientious representative 
of Jordan’s religious judiciary, tried to banter with the crowd—
unsuccessfully—as he readied the first substantial PowerPoint slide: a wall of 
yellow text on a black background. Rather than read from it, he said, “in all 
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things you have to prepare yourself. When you want to pray, you must do your 
ablutions. A soldier going into battle must train, have a plan, have supplies. A 
teacher before going to the classroom needs a plan. Marriage is like that. In 
order that you do not oppress.” In trying to connect with his audience, the 
judge attempted to explain his vision of ethical self-fashioning not just with 
reference to Islamic precedents (the ritual requirements surrounding prayer) 
but also to the ubiquitous, predominantly male institutional contexts of modern 
and pre-modern states (schools and the military). The imagery makes sense 
because the Islamic discursive tradition can both embed itself in and be 
generative of these sorts of state institutions. The Chastity Society’s gender 
discourse, precisely because it is Islamic, is associated with much older ways 
of ‘living through, talking about and acting on social orders characterized by 
domination’ (Roseberry 1994: 361). 
Turning to the first slide, the sheikh said, “The first material right (haq 
mādī) of the woman is the mahr,” using a word that can either be translated as 
bridewealth (a payment for the bride’s family) or alimony (a payment for the 
bride herself in case of divorce). Again, the topic was not exactly new. Tucker, 
writing of Ottoman Syria and Palestine in the seventeenth century, reports that 
the mufti of Ramla, Imad Khayr al-Din, “waged a campaign of sorts against 
the manifold ways in which family interests worked to erode a woman’s right 
to her maher” (1998: 54). In the same spirit, Dr. Samir continued, “Sometimes, 
maybe the man gives the woman 1000 dinar in front of people, and she returns 
it to him on Sunday?” The audience nodded along. “You know this is ḥarām 
(forbidden). The mahr is her right (ḥaq). If she returns it, this is what?” The 
women’s side of the room replied in unison, “ḥarām!” “That’s right,” Dr. 
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Samir continued, “it is what? Unrighteous (āthim).” “The mahr is the entrance 
fee (rasūm al-dakhūl) paid to the woman. Her person remains autonomous. 
Many young men don’t understand this.” Here, Dr. Samir was playing on the 
dual meanings of haq as right and price—as well as the longstanding conflict 
over what mahr is and who it is for. The idea of the woman’s person remaining 
autonomous also has Islamic and pre-Islamic precedent—but one which flies 
in the face of Christian notions of a bride who “gives her body” and her “self” 
to her husband through marriage (cf. Sonbol 2008: 109).  
Dr. Samir moved on to the next slide, which was headed by a saying of 
the Prophet about mahr being “to enrich the friendship of his wife” and not to 
create “enmity.” “Does it do to request a high mahr?” Dr. Samir asked. The 
room was quiet. “Young men?” Again, silence. He tried another tack: “How 
many of you have mahr?” Dr. Mufid replied that they all did. Attempting a 
joke, he asked, “How many grooms think their mahr is too much?” A number 
of people glowered. “How many women think their mahr is too little?” There 
was a bit of fidgeting. Dr. Samir went on to say that it was important that the 
woman be respected but that the mahr not be more than the man could afford 
such that he might come to hate his wife. These dynamics too are longstanding 
and familiar: Tucker notes a lively jurisprudential discourse on what 
constituted “proper” mahr as a means of ensuring the kafā’a (suitability) of 
grooms. Kafā’a was a “one way street” (Tucker 2008: 45) concerned with 
determining whether a prospective husband had the financial means to support 
a woman. As such, it provides a fascinating window into changing legal 
conceptions of social and economic status. 
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Dr. Samir moved onto the second material right: nafaqa (allowance). 
He asked, “How many of the men don’t work?” One man raised his hand a bit 
but thought better of it. No one else raised a hand. Dr. Samir continued, 
“Anything you eat, give some to your wife to satisfy her. As you dress, dress 
her. Not in pants and shirt!” The room laughed at this. Pleased with himself, 
Dr. Samir smiled and continued, “I mean from the same class. The husband is 
the one who brings the wealth and the wife is the one who preserves it.” He 
switched the slide to the next one: “obedience” (al-ṭa‘a). “If a man goes out 
every day and eats barbequed lamb while his wife buys her own bread, is this 
right?” he asked. The room replied, “NO!” He continued, “And if the wife eats 
barbequed lamb and the husband eats bread?” The room replied, less 
enthusiastically, “No.” Dr. Samir corrected them. “Actually that’s fine. As long 
as he’s satisfied: it’s his choice.” Next, he asked, “If a woman’s father gives 
her 100 dinar, can the husband take it and hide it or spend it? No. It’s her 
autonomous (mustaqila) wealth.” All of this was, of course, the stuff of village 
gossip and Peletz’s “practical representations.” Everyone knew that excessive 
feasting and “borrowing” money from one’s wife constituted forbidden forms 
of oppression that were, sadly, all too common. Amira Sonbol’s study of 
Islamic and pre-Islamic marriage contracts provides evidence that these 
conflicts are incredibly longstanding:  “Words like kafā’a, nafaqa, ṭā‘a, the 
description of marriage as mawadda wa-raḥma (companionship and mercy), 
the husband’s responsibility for clothing his wife and housing her as expected 
of her class or mathīlatihā, all have resonance in pre-Islamic contracts” (2008: 
93)10.  
                                                 
10 As Frances Hasso notes, these rights are at odds with the gender norms enshrined in 
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Tucker describes the rights and duties of marriage in Islamic Law as a 
confluence of the “twin doctrines” of nafaqa (maintenance) and nashūz 
(disobedience). She argues that jurists, “constructed the wife as her husband’s 
dependent, but as a dependent with definite entitlements” (Tucker 2008: 50-
52). Dr. Samir’s presentation approached this most patriarchal aspect of 
Islamic jurisprudence through two slides, entitled “The woman leaving the 
house” and “The right of discipline.” Of interest here is not the Chastity 
Society’s wholesale acceptance of this patriarchal ideal, but rather how the 
patriarchal ideal itself is predicated on the presumed ability of the Islamic 
discursive tradition to discipline excessive masculine passions. The first slide, 
in framing the issue of the woman’s right to leave, shifted the focus away from 
an earlier debate among jurists about what Tucker calls, “the tricky issue of the 
parameters of a husband’s rights to wifely obedience versus his wife’s 
religious and broader familial duties” (2008: 53). Instead, he asked, “Can the 
woman leave the house without permission?” The room loudly responded, 
“No.” Dr. Samir continued, “Will you young men give permission?” The room 
                                                                                                                                
contemporary international treaties, which are based on “total gender equality with regard to 
housing provision, economic maintenance of the marital home and children, and child 
support.” Yet Hasso argues that, “this ‘traditional’ logic may explain why poverty and 
economic wellbeing in Arab countries are not necessarily feminized and masculinized” 
(2009:67). Of course, as Abu Lughod has noted, the tendency is to ignore such areas where 
Arab and Muslim women fare better than women elsewhere, which include “sweatshop 
exploitation, HIV/AIDS, eating disorders, substance abuse, famine, the feminization of 
poverty, and violence, both domestic and genocidal” (2005:86). However, as both Hasso and 
Abu Lughod argue, it would be difficult to interest Muslim audiences in a broader global 
feminist project without first exploring how challenging such women’s prerogatives might 
burden Muslim women with new vulnerabilities. 
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was quiet, but one man said, “According to the request.” Dr. Samir then 
directly contradicted him by listing the reasons why women could leave the 
house with or without permission: 
-To request their right 
-To request their allowance (nafaqa) 
-To ask questions of scholars 
-Because of emergencies in the spousal residence 
-To receive permission for divorce 
-For familial visits  
 
 Dr. Samir said that it was important to ask permission anyway and to do so 
nicely since, “ibn an-nās (a decent young man) would never say ‘Don’t visit 
your family.’” He added that a woman has a right to visit her parents every 
week and her aunts, uncles, cousins, brothers and sisters once a year. Summing 
up, he said, “There is mercy in the Sharia.” The women let out a long and 
spirited note of assent. 
Dr. Samir switched the slide forward and yet another block of yellow 
text on black background appeared. At the top, it read, “The right of 
discipline.” Once again, Dr. Samir managed to emphasize the need for male 
restraint. His model here was a much-remarked upon verse of the Quran that 
has been taken by some jurists as “justification for beating disobedient wives”: 
“And those you fear may be rebellious admonish; banish them to their couches, 
and beat them” (4:34, Quoted in Tucker 2008: 55). In Dr. Samir’s hands, 
however, the verse became a set of stringent ritual demands. He explained to 
the men: “First, talk with excellent words. Say that the house is dirty and that 
you would like it to be clean.” He supplied a number of ways a man could 
register his displeasure while showing the proper degree of respect. “Second, 
turn your face away from her (tiba‘id wijihak minha). Let’s say you return and 
the house is dirtier than ever. Keep away from her so that she knows the reason 
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and knows that you want the house to be clean.” This was his euphemistic way 
of emphasizing that a man may not simply hit his wife in anger: he must make 
a conscious decision to cease sexual relations with her after attempts at 
dialogue have failed. The implication of Dr. Samir’s counsel was that losing 
control and acting out violently while in a state of ritual impurity would 
delegitimize a man’s pretensions to rationality and leadership over the 
household—that the husband would be disgraced rather than the disobedient 
wife. He trailed off and paused before continuing, “Third, a justifiable blow. 
Not with a stick or something hard.” A man from the audience chimed in, “A 
hose!” Dr. Samir retorted, “This is supposed to be light. Just so she knows that 
you are angry.”  
Silence settled over the room. “How many of you read the Quran 
daily?” Dr. Samir asked. No one raised their hand. “Yearly?” A few hands 
went up. “Who doesn’t pray?” One person raised his hand. He repeated his 
questions for the women: some read the Quran every day. Most read it every 
year. They all prayed. He said, “It’s important to read the Quran to know about 
your creation.” Dr. Samir then said, “There are hormones. Do you know what 
hormones are? Sometimes she’s angry without reason when she’s pregnant, 
after she gives birth, before she gives birth. She says, ‘I’m mad. Why are you 
wearing black?’ Just say you’re sorry and go along with her.” This invocation 
of hormones to excuse—and naturalize—female irrationality is in keeping with 
Peletz’s observations that rationality and its absence are qualities of both 
genders. Yet if female passions were dismissed as manifestations of hormonāt, 
they were not seen as in need of transformation in the way male passions were.  
 28 
Dr. Samir concluded his presentation by saying, “Marriage is a 
religious duty for us. Prayer is the first duty, but marriage is very important.” 
He solicited questions and, not receiving any, he began to quiz the audience. 
He asked, “What are the rights? I want to hear from the men.” There was more 
silence. A few people shouted out: “obedience, respect.” Then a woman said, 
“Being able to leave the home.” Dr. Samir asked, “When can the woman leave 
the home?” Unlike the men, a number of the women had taken careful notes, 
especially on key points like reasons for leaving the house and the protocol for 
striking a wife. They gave verbatim accounts of what had been said on these 
topics. Dr. Mufid responded, “See, young men? These women have been 
taking notes on the paper we gave them. I will give them prizes after this is 
over.” A man said, “Thank you for your presentation. But you didn’t talk about 
one important point. Sometimes women bring bad guests to the house. Their 
female friends cause problems. Is this not allowed?”  
The question reflected the respectful yet visibly cool reception Dr. 
Samir that the sheikh was receiving from the men. In contrast to the women, 
who were eagerly taking notes and engaging in call-and-response, the men 
mostly sat stiffly and humorlessly in their chairs throughout. As if to counter 
Dr. Samir’s presentation, the man’s question shifted the onus for marital 
harmony away from the husband and onto the wife. Dr. Samir assented, “Yes. 
The man can forbid any woman … or man! ... from coming to the house if he 
isn’t satisfied with them.” With that, Dr. Samir said “Congratulations, God 
willing” and the men responded in unison with a spirited, “God bless you, 
too.” The women left first to get their refreshments. Once they had finished 
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and gone into the designated women’s break room, the men burst forth to 
smoke.  
What was surprising was the degree to which the young men had been 
won over by the end of the day despite their initial awkwardness and their 
mockery of Dr. Samir. By the end, they eagerly took the speakers’ phone 
numbers and seemed keen to avail themselves of their advice and admonition 
in the future. The seductiveness of the Chastity Society’s discourse seemed to 
flow from its ability to simultaneously criticize and reify patriarchal gender 
roles. This meant extensively codifying the support and protection that men are 
expected to provide for women, but doing so in ways that ultimately equip men 
to discipline women better and more responsibly. The resulting marital climate 
might be improved, but is it new? Is it even exclusively Muslim? As Sonbol’s 
research shows, the Islamic technical vocabulary of kafā’a (suitability), nafaqa 
(financial support), and ṭā‘a (obedience) that undergirds the gender paradigm 
endorsed by the Chastity Society has deep pre-Islamic antecedents.  
The persistence of such terms within the Islamic discursive tradition 
suggests that they may be crucial inflection points through which Muslim 
reformers, engaging with gendered and generational conflicts, have penetrated 
otherwise disinterested or hostile communities. The Indian legal scholar Flavia 
Agnes has gone so far as to argue that these Islamic legal concepts have in fact 
actively shaped Western family law since the colonial period. She quotes an 
1867 ruling of the Privy Council upholding the ruling of a court in colonial 
India, which remarked, “Distinction must be drawn between the rights of a 
Mohammedan and a Hindu woman. In all that concerns her power over her 
property, the former is, by law, far more independent, in fact even more 
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independent than an English woman.” She argues that such rulings, by 
recognizing “a wide range of rights based on women’s active agency” under 
Islamic law, “not only safeguarded the rights of Muslim women, but also 
served to expand the boundaries of matrimonial law in general” (Agnes 2011: 
4). Of course, as Agnes herself is well aware, such attempts to “lend credence 
to the claims of the weak against the status-quo-ist institutions” (2011: 13) 
constitute a highly fraught and contradictory project that is bound to remain on 
the margins of those institutions. Yet this might not make such a project any 
less contagious. In fact, such projects might emerge precisely where competing 
discursive traditions begin to bump up against one another, inexorably drawing 
otherwise distinct traditions into a shared language of contention. 
The Chastity Society’s training course was a discursive collision of 
precisely this kind. Its moral integrity was expressed in terms understood to be 
quintessentially Muslim, and explicit contrast to non-Muslim ideas and 
practices only intensified this sense of a distinctive religious tradition. Even the 
relentless appeal to rights (huqūq) could not be confused with Western 
liberalism, though Western liberalism was its obvious foil, and the status of 
women was its ideological test. The Chastity Society’s agenda was as much 
comparative as it was critical, and it could be so only if a certain amount of 
overlap with its objects of critique–tradition and the West–could be held in 
place. 
This overlap has both geographic and historical dimensions, and this 
gives ‘tradition’ a centrality to these ideological encounters that 
anthropologists cannot easily ignore. Arguably, it is when the incitement to 
discourse around gender and Islam is strongest that we should be most 
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skeptical about the ‘inventedness’ of those discourses. The risk is that, in the 
rush to explain a sudden spike in (for example) Western interest in saving 
Muslim women and disciplining Muslim men, we will ignore the degree to 
which protective impulses, manifest in diverse forms, are also present in 
Muslim societies, where they have been active and continually reinforced by 
broader social structures over time. “Framing women’s problems” by 
“opposing allegedly universal standards and local religio-cultural norms” is not 
just a post-9/11 fad or even a “classic liberal feminist formulation” (cf. Abu 
Lughod 2009: 94). It is far older than liberalism, the idea of “the West,” or 
Islam itself11. Male Islamic authority has always rested to a degree on the 
notion that women must be protected from excessive masculine passions borne 
of a surrender to unthinking tradition. It follows that no matter how insincere 
Western attempts at humanitarian rescue may be, no matter how tone-deaf 
their particulars, they can never be morally unintelligible to a Muslim 
audience. On the other hand, these humanitarian motifs are unlikely to win 
praise for breaking new ground—especially if they fail to consider the terms in 
which Muslim women already articulate and contest their place in their 
communities. 
Conclusion 
One of the most obvious effects of such disciplinary projects is their 
ability to create a sense of inside and outside, self and other—and to break it 
down. Ewing writes that, “abjection is thus the process of maintaining a sense 
                                                 
11 Kraemer’s (1992) work on women’s religions in the ancient world offers a skeptical review 
of debates on the relative role of universal standards and particularistic local norms in 
mediating women’s religious experiences in the Hellenic, pre-Islamic world. 
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of wholeness of identity by casting out that which is felt to be improper or 
dangerous to the integrity of the self” (2008:3). There was an uncomfortable 
interplay in the training course between this sense of disciplining an other and 
the more familiar self-disciplining that Agrama (2010), Mahmood (2005), 
Asad (1986), and Hirschkind (2006) attribute to the Islamic revival. One might 
note here the important distinction in Islamic teachings between the greater and 
lesser jihads: the greater (internal) struggle being superior to the lesser 
(external) struggle. Ultimately, for the Chastity Society, the bridging of 
differences in class, values, and educational attainment between activists and 
beneficiaries proved to be a difficult, but surmountable task. By the end of the 
day, the activists had successfully mobilized a combination of official and 
practical representations to make arguments about how best to discipline one’s 
self in harmony with the order of things—up to and including paying for 
people’s weddings when parents were unable or unwilling to help. This was 
one of a whole host of conflicts intrinsic to widespread kinship patterns in 
Jordan that the Chastity Society could use to act upon a nominally Muslim 
community of which it was already part.  
Clearly, this is also the putative aspiration of the forms of Western 
humanitarian rescue discourse targeting the abjected figures of the Muslim 
woman and the Muslim man. Driven by a negative urge to de-identify with 
certain models of gender, both Islamist and Western participants in this shared 
language of contention grapple with contradictory claims to universality and 
particularity, seeking the broadest range of action and the narrowest range of 
ethical self-compromise. Ironically, however, as they seek to stigmatize their 
rivals, these actors contribute to a widespread and increasingly coherent set of 
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assumptions about men and women. Whether we adopt Roseberry’s Gramscian 
terminology of “hegemonic” and “subaltern” or Peletz’ more Bourdieuian 
language of “official” and “practical” representations of kinship, we can begin 
to see how certain governing forms can emerge not by conscious design but 
rather from the agonistic and polemical clashes of forces who do not yet 
understand that they are working in tandem—in service of projects that they 
may not even fully comprehend.  
Even the purest of intentions need not lead to a situation wherein 
disciplining Muslim men destabilizes the long-running alliance between 
patriarchy and the repressive powers of the state12. In fact, both the Western 
and Islamic versions of this disciplinary project seem to share a tendency to 
reify and naturalize a set of problematic gender roles defined by male 
aggression and female vulnerability—the very things they seek to overcome. 
The power imbalance and conflict between the genders constitutes a means 
through which social actors can hope to act by claiming to fully comprehend 
the natural or divine order of things from a position of detached, reflexive 
exteriority. These are the makings of a language of contention around the 
humanitarian rescue of women that, paradoxically, ensures that its speakers 
will generate vivid perceptions of difference and mutual incomprehension as 
they act out their underlying agreement on what, in the shared worlds of men 
and women, is most worthy of dispute.
                                                 
12 Mounira Charrad (2001) offers a broadly comparative primer on the workings of this 
alliance between religious reformers, the state, and the patriarchal household in contemporary 
North Africa. 
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